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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

JAMES RAPHAEL SANCHEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20140749-CA
Appellant is incarcerated.

INTRODUCTION
James Raphael Sanchez (James) appeals his convictions for murder and
obstructing justice. He challenges his murder conviction on the ground that the trial court
wrongfully excluded evidence of out-of-court statements that James proffered under Rule
106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. James proffered the evidence to support his theory of
the case: special mitigation based on extreme emotional distress. The evidentiary
exclusion was prejudicial because it precluded James from presenting this theory. James
..J

also challenges his obstructing justice conviction on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to support it.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103 (2)0). See
Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment); R.726-27, 738-41, 746.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue I: In a recorded statement to police, James confessed to the assault that

caused the death of Angela Jenkins (Angela) and explained that he assaulted Angela
because she told him she was cheating on him with his brother. At trial, the prosecution
introduced James' s confession to the assault. Under Rule 106, James proffered his
explanation of why he assaulted Angela. The trial court denied the proffer. As a result,
the jury was not instructed on James's theory of extreme emotional distress. Did the trial
court reversibly err when it denied James' s Rule 106 proffer?
Standard ofReview: A trial court's "authority to allow evidence ... 'under Rule
106 is not"' '"discretionary."' State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, iJIO, 76 P.3d 1165.
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R.749:151-54, 161-68; 750:4-8.
Issue II: Whether the evidence was insufficient to support James's conviction for
obstructing justice because no reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that James concealed, removed, or destroyed evidence specifically intending to
hinder the investigation of Angela's murder.
Standard of Review: "When a defendant challenges a jury verdict for insufficiency
of the evidence, '[the court] review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may be
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Noor, 2012
UT App 187, iJ4, 283 P.3d 543 (memorandum decision). The court "will reverse the
jury's verdict 'only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."' Id.
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R.750:35-38. But to the extent the Court
believes it is not, it should review the issue for plain error. See State v. Mohamed, 2012
2

UT App 183, 13,282 P.3d 1066. "When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
under the plain error doctrine, 'a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency
~

was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the
jury."' Id. (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 117, 10 P.3d 346).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following are attached at Addendum B: Utah Code §§76-5-203, 76-5-205.5,
76-8-306; Utah R. Evid. 106.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged James with murder and obstructing justice. R.1-3. After a jury
trial, James was convicted of both charges. R.642, 726-27; 750:110. He timely appeals.
R.726-37.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
James and Angela were in a relationship and lived together in an apartment in Salt
Lake City. R.748:30; 749:73-74, 94-96. They were in their apartment on the night of May
~

4, 2011, when Angela repeatedly told James that she was cheating on him with his
brother. R.748:45-46, 57, 61-62; 749:80-82, 166-69. Enraged, James began to assault her,
asking her to tell him she would end the affair. R.749:166-69. Angela would not accede
to James's requests. R.749: 166-69. The incident continued into the early morning hours.
R.749:90-91. At one point, James brought Angela into the bathroom to place her head

,.;;

under the bathtub faucet to wash blood off of her face and prevent her from losing
consciousness. R.749:95-97. Sometime around 8 or 9 a.m., Angela, lying on her back on

3

the bedroom floor, lost consciousness as James applied pressure to her neck with his
forearm. R.749:91-92, 97-99. She never woke up. R.749:91-92, 98-99. James laid down
next to her and slept for an hour or two. R.749:92, 98.
After James awoke, he called his friend, Roger Gary Warner (Roger). R.748:9192; 749:92. He was crying and scared because Angela was not waking up. R.748:91-92;
749:142. He asked Roger to come pick him up. R.748:91-93; 749:92-93. He then called
911 and reported that there was someone at his location who was not breathing.
R.748: 125-27; 749:92-93. He left the door to the apartment slightly open for the police
and left with Roger. R.748:76-77; 749:28. Five minutes after the first 911 call, James
placed another 911 call from a pay phone at a nearby convenience store. R.748:100-01,
131-36, 207; R.749:73-74, 117-18. He and Roger then went to Roger's house, where they
took a nap in Roger's bed. R. 748: 102-04. Before James climbed into the bed, Roger told
him to take off his pants because they had blood on them. R.748: 102. James complied.
R.748: 102-03.
The police arrived outside Roger's house after identifying James as the primary
suspect in Angela's death and tracing his whereabouts. R.748:83, 205-12; 749:3-5, 73-75.
They made several attempts to contact the inhabitants. R.749:4-6. After approximately an
hour and a half, Roger emerged first. R.749:4-6. James came out approximately an hour
and forty minutes later. R.749:6. He was wearing underwear without pants and shoes
without socks. R.749:9. He informed the police that he had taken seventeen methadone
pills. R.749:77, 119. He was arrested and taken to the hospital, where he received
treatment for a methadone overdose. R.749:6, 119-20, 144.
4

Det. Chad Reyes (Reyes) interviewed James while James was recovering at the
hospital. R.749:78-79. The interview was audio-recorded, and the recording was
transcribed. R.749:87. In the interview, James confessed to the prolonged assault on
~

Angela. R.749:81-92, 95-99. He explained that he did it because of the emotional distress
he experienced after Angela repeatedly told him that she was cheating on him with his
brother and refused to say that she would end the affair. R.749:166-68. He admitted that
Angela lost consciousness and never regained it after he pressed his forearm into her
neck. R.749:91-92, 97-99. He asked Reyes if Angela was "okay," if she had "ma[d]e it."
R.749:139. When Reyes answered no, James was "distraught." R.749:141.
At trial, the State introduced a portion of the statement James gave to Reyes at the
hospital. R.749:78-99. Specifically, the State introduced James's confession to assaulting
Angela. R.749:78-99. The confession was introduced through the testimony of Reyes,
though he and the prosecutor explicitly relied on the transcript of the interview in
presenting the testimony. R.749:85, 87, 93.
Afterwards, James proffered a different part of his statement to Reyes. R.749:12833, 166-68. Specifically, he proffered his explanation to Reyes of why he assaulted
Angela: she repeatedly told him that she was cheating on him with his brother and she
refused to say she would end the affair. R.749: 128-33, 166-68. James intended to use this
evidence to support his theory of the case: he acted under the influence of extreme
emotional distress. R.747:2, 5; 748:42-43; 749:130, 163-64, 171-72; 750:4-5, 13; see also

~

Utah Code §76-5-205.S(l)(b) ("Special mitigation exists when the actor causes the death
of another ... under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a
5

reasonable explanation or excuse."). James offered the evidence on the ground that
Angela's statements were not hearsay, and his statement, although hearsay, was
admissible under Rules 106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. R.749:152-54, 161-64. He
also argued that excluding the evidence would deprive him of his right to present a
defense. R.749:163-64; see also R.149:130.
The trial court denied the proffer, ruling that the evidence constituted double
hearsay that did not qualify for admission under Rule 106. R.750:4-12. The court
reasoned that the proffered part of James's statement was a "self-serving, after-the-fact
explanation" for the assault that was "temporally removed" from the inculpatory part
introduced by the prosecution. R.750:8. As a result of the ruling, James conceded that the
evidence did not support a jury instruction on extreme emotional distress, and no such
instruction was given. R.750: 13.
At the close of evidence, James moved for a directed verdict on the obstructing

justice charge, arguing that the evidence failed to show that James acted with the
requisite intent. R.750:35-36. The trial court denied the motion. R.750:38. In closing
argument, the prosecution argued that James was guilty of obstructing justice because the
evidence showed that he cleaned Angela and the apartment after Angela died but before
he left with Roger. R.750:65-66, 72-73, 96. Alternatively, the prosecution argued that
James was guilty of obstructing justice because he traveled from the apartment to Roger's
house wearing his pants and socks, which had Angela's blood on them. R.750:66-67.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying James' s Rule 106 proffer of the part of his
statement to Reyes in which he explained why he assaulted Angela: she repeatedly told
~

him that she was cheating on him with his brother. The trial court ruled that the evidence
was inadmissible double hearsay on the ground that James's statement and Angela's
statement were both offered for the truth of the matter asserted. This ruling was incorrect.
Angela's statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It was offered to
explain why James assaulted Angela, regardless of the statement's truth. James's
statement, on the other hand, was hearsay. But it was nevertheless admissible under Rule
106 because it was relevant to James' s theory of special mitigation based on extreme
emotional distress and it was necessary to qualify the part of James statement introduced
by the prosecution in which James confessed to the assault that caused Angela's death.
The denial of James's Rule 106 proffer was prejudicial because it precluded James from
presenting his theory of the case, to wit, he was entitled to special mitigation because he
killed Angela under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there was a

..J

reasonable explanation or excuse.
The evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to sustain James' s conviction for
obstructing justice because there was no evidence that James ever concealed or destroyed

~

evidence specifically intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder.
Culpability can be implied from the actions and statements of the defendant, but the
vJ

evidence must be clear enough that the jury does not have to speculate. James' s
conviction for obstructing justice depended on speculation.
7

ARGUMENT

I.

Under Rule 106, the trial court was required to admit the part of James's
statement to Reyes in which he explained why he assaulted Angela because
it was necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the part of the
statement in which James confessed to the assault. Excluding the evidence
was prejudicial because it precluded James from presenting his theory of
the case.
The excluded evidence at issue is James's out-of-court statement to Reyes that he

assaulted Angela because she repeatedly told him that she was cheating on him with his
brother. R.749:166-68; 750:4-12. The trial court ruled that this evidence constituted
inadmissible double hearsay. R.750:6; see also Utah R. Evid. 805 ("Hearsay within
hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined
statements conforms with an exception to the rule."). Thus, as a preliminary matter, it is
necessary to address whether the court was correct that James's statement and Angela's
statement were both hearsay. See Prosper, Inc. v. Dep 't of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT
App 281, ~8, 168 P.3d 344 ("The determination of whether evidence constitutes hearsay
is a question of law that we review for correctness.").

It was not. Angela's statement was not hearsay. And although James's statement
was hearsay, it was admissible hearsay.
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by [the Utah Rules of
Evidence]." Utah R. Evid. 802. "'Hearsay' means a statement that ... the declarant does
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing ... and ... a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Utah R. Evid. 80l(c)
(emphasis added); see also State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, ~27, 335 P.3d 900

8

Q

("[O]ut-of-court statements not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted are by
definition not hearsay."). Therefore, the "hearsay rule does not bar" a statement offered
"without regard to whether it be true or false." McCullar, 2014 UT App 215,127
~

(internal quotation marks omitted).
Angela's statement is not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted in it. It was offered to explain James's conduct, not to prove that Angela
was cheating on James with his brother. R.749:153-55. In fact, whether Angela was
actually cheating on James was irrelevant to James' s theory of extreme emotional
distress. 1 All that mattered for James' s theory is that Angela told James she was cheating
on him with his brother-regardless of whether it was true-which caused James extreme
emotional distress under the influence of which he committed the assault. See Utah Code
§76-5-205.5(1)(b); see also McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, 127 (explaining that a
statement offered simply to show that '"the statement was made,"' "'without regard to
whether it be true or false,"' is not hearsay) (quoting State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 390-91
(Utah 1957)). Because Angela's statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter

..J

asserted in it, it is not hearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 80l(c). Hence, the trial court was
incorrect that the excluded evidence constituted double hearsay.
On the other hand, James's statement is concededly hearsay. It was offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in it: that Angela repeatedly told him that she was
cheating on him with his brother. But it was nevertheless admissible hearsay under Rule
1 Notably,

the trial court acknowledged this on the first day of trial. R.747:3. This
acknowledgement is at odds with the court's ruling on the last day of trial that Angela's
statement was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See R.750:6.
9

106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See infra Point I.A. And excluding the statement was
prejudicial because it deprived James of the ability to present his theory of the case. See

infra Point I.B.
A. Under Rule 106, the trial court was required to admit the portion ofJames 's
statement to Reyes in which he explained why he assaulted Angela because it
was necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the inculpatory
portion of the statement that was introduced by the prosecution.
The common law rule of completeness "generally provides that a party may
introduce the whole of a statement if any part is introduced by the opposing party." State

v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ~9, 76 P.3d 1165. Under that rule, when the prosecution
presents part of a defendant's out-of-court statement and the "statement contains both
disserving and self-serving [parts], the whole must be admitted and considered by the
jury" at the defendant's request. State v. Dunkley, 39 P.2d 1097, 1109 (Utah 1935),

overruled on other grounds by State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943); see also State v.
Martin, 300 P. 1034, 1038 (Utah 1931) (same). Of course, the jury need not give the
disserving and self-serving parts equal credit. Dunkley, 39 P.2d at 1109; Martin, 300 P. at
1038.
The common law rule of completeness is partially codified in Rule 106 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. Utah R. Evid. 106; Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ~9; State v. Leleae, 1999
UT App 368, ,J43, 993 P.2d 232. Rule 106 provides:
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse
party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part-or any other
writing or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be considered at the
same time.

10

Utah R. Evid. 106. It requires the admission of"those portions of a statement relevant
and necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already introduced."

Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 143 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cruz-Meza,
~

2003 UT 32, 114 (same). Under Rule 106, "the exculpatory portion of
a defendant's statement should be admitted if it is relevant to an issue in the case and
necessary to clarify or explain the portion received." United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d
1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 106); see also Utah R. Evid. 106
advisory committee's note ("This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.").
As our supreme court has explained, Rule 106 "merely requires that the material
sought to be admitted 'ought in fairness' to be admitted with the portion already
introduced.'' Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 114. Moreover, a trial court's "authority to allow
evidence ... 'under Rule 106 is not"' discretionary. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 11 0; see

also id. 1,9-15 ( explaining that the doctrine of oral completeness contained in Rule 611
affords trial courts discretion while Rule 106 does not).
In Leleae, the prosecution presented inculpatory parts of an out-of-court statement
.,j)

that the defendant, Leleae, gave to a detective. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ,,38-41. The
statement was recorded and transcribed, but the prosecution introduced the inculpatory
parts through the detective's testimony. Id.

1138, 41. Leleae moved to admit the entire

statement, which also contained exculpatory parts, under Rule 106. Id. ,143-44. The trial
court denied Leleae's motion. Id. ,138-41 & 140 n.4. It ruled that Rule 106 did not apply.

Id. 140 n.4. In the alternative, the court decided to exclude the statement even if Rule 106

11

applied on the ground that the statement was self-serving. Id. ,r40 n.4. Leleae was
convicted of aggravated assault. Id.

,r1.

On appeal, this Court held that Rule 106 applied because Leleae's statement "was
tape recorded and then transcribed from that recording." Id. ,r44. But the Court further
held that the trial court did not err in denying Leleae's request to admit the entire
statement because Leleae presented the exculpatory parts of the statement during crossexamination of the detective and "other testimony supported his version of the events."

Id. ,r,r45-46. Thus, Leleae was able to introduce the parts of his statement that were
"'necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context"' the parts presented by the
prosecution. Id. ,r,r43, 45-46. Accordingly, the Court concluded that admitting Leleae's
entire statement was not '"necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context"' the parts
of it presented by the prosecution. Id. ,r43.
Leleae is the only Utah appellate opinion applying Rule 106,2 but cases from other

jurisdictions are instructive. Cox v. United States, 898 A.2d 376 (D.C. 2006), is one
example. There, the defendant, Cox, was charged with several possession crimes,
including unlawful firearm possession and carrying a pistol without a license. Id. at 378.
The prosecutor elicited testimony from the arresting officer that Cox never said he had a
license for the firearm. Id. at 379. Invoking the federal counterpart to Rule 106, the
defendant proffered part of Cox's out-of-court statement to the officer that explained why
he was in possession of the firearm: "he had gone to the firing range the night before and

However, State v. Cruz-Meza interprets Rule 106 in some depth. 2003 UT 32, ,r,r9-15,
76 P.3d 1165.
2

12

had forgotten about the gun after putting it in the car." Id. at 379-81. The trial court
denied the proffer, and Cox was convicted. Id. at 378-80. On appeal, the court held that
the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence proffered was relevant to Cox's
l.@

defense and it was necessary to qualify the officer's testimony that Cox never said he had
a license for the firearm. Id. at 381-82. However, the court found that the error was
harmless, in large part because Cox himself testified to the proffered statement. Id. at
382-83.
Another example is State v. Cabrera-Pena, 605 S.E.2d 522 (S.C. 2004). There, the
defendant, Cabrera-Pena, was charged with murder in the shooting death of his estranged
wife. Id. at 523-24. At trial, the State introduced out-of-court inculpatory statements
Cabrera-Pena made to police. Id. at 523-25. Cabrera-Pena then proffered a written
statement he made to police indicating that he did not intend to shoot the victim. Id. at
523. The trial court denied the proffer, and Cabrera-Pena was convicted. Id. at 523-24.
On certiorari, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred because
the proffered statement "tend[ed] to explain or qualify" the inculpatory statements

v)

introduced by the prosecution. Id. at 523-26; see also Long v. State, 610 So.2d 1276,
1278-81 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting
portions of defendant's television interview in which he admitted to uncharged crimes
and precluding defendant from introducing other portions of interview).
Here, the trial court correctly concluded that Rule 106 applies because James' s
statement to Reyes was recorded and then transcribed. R.750:7; Leleae, 1999 UT App
368, ,I44. But, as in Cox and Cabrera-Pena, the trial court erred by prohibiting James
13

from introducing the exculpatory (or mitigating) parts of his statement to Reyes. In the
part of the statement that James sought to introduce, he explained to Reyes why he

Q

assaulted Angela: she repeatedly told him that she was cheating on him with his brother.
R. 749: 166-68. So, the part James sought to introduce was '"relevant"' to his theory of
extreme emotional distress and it was "'necessary to qualify, explain, or place into
context"' the inculpatory parts introduced by the prosecution. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368,
143.
Thus, this case is unlike Leleae. There, the defendant was able to introduce the
parts of his statement that were "'relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, and place
into context"' the parts introduced by the prosecution. Id. 1143, 45-46. He was also able
to present other evidence supporting his theory of the case. Id. iJ145-46. So, in Leleae,
admitting the defendant's proffered evidence-his entire statement-was unnecessary.

Id. 1143, 45-46. Here, however, James did not seek to introduce his entire statement, but
only selected parts that were "'relevant"' to his theory of the case and "'necessary to
qualify, explain, or place into context"' the parts introduced by the prosecution. Id. ,J43.
Moreover, James was unable to present any other evidence supporting his theory of the
case. 3 To put it succinctly, the difference between this case and Leleae is that the

3

Although not a relevant consideration under Rule 106, it is perhaps notable that James
would not have been able to testify to Angela's statement even if he had taken the stand
because the trial court ruled that her statement was inadmissible hearsay. R.750:6; see
also United States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 708, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that a trial
court cannot deny a defendant's proffer under the federal counterpart to Rule 106 on the
basis that the defendant decided not to testify); State v. Cabrera-Pena, 605 S.E.2d 522,
524-25 (S.C. 2004) (holding that a trial court cannot deny a defendant's proffer under
South Carolina's counterpart to Rule 106 on the basis that the defendant decided not to
14
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proffered evidence here was "'necessary,"' whereas the proffered evidence in Leleae was
not. Id.
The trial court gave two reasons for denying James's proffer: (1) the part of his
~

statement he sought to introduce was "self-serving" and (2) it was "temporally removed"
from the parts introduced by the prosecution. R.750:8. Neither of these reasons is valid
for excluding evidence offered under Rule I 06.
A trial court may not exclude a statement offered under Rule 106 on the basis that
it is self-serving, for three related reasons. First, Rule I 06 is a partial codification of the
common law rule of completeness, Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ,i9, which expressly allowed
a defendant to introduce relevant "self-serving" parts of his out-of-court statement when
the prosecution introduced "disserving" parts of the statement against him. Dunkley, 39
P.2d at 1109; Martin, 300 P. at 1038. Second, the self-servingness of a statement is
relevant only to its "trustworthiness, [which is] a consideration absent from [R]ule 106."
Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ,II 4. It is for the jury, not the court, to evaluate the

trustworthiness of a statement under Rule I 06. See Dunkley, 39 P .2d at 1109; Martin, 300
..iJ

P. at 1038. Third, a central purpose of Rule 106 is to allow parties to introduce selfserving statements that qualify, explain, or put into context disserving statements
introduced against them under the opposing party-declarant rule. See Utah R. Evid.
80 I (d)(2); see also Baker, 432 F .3d at 1223 ("[T]he exculpatory portion of
testify). Thus, even if James had testified, and even if he had been able to testify to his
belief that Angela was cheating on him with his brother, he still would have been unable
to testify to Angela's statement, and therefore he would have been unable to present
evidence that he acted "under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there
is a reasonable explanation or excuse." Utah Code §76-5-205.S(l)(b) (emphasis added).
15

a defendant's statement should be admitted if it is relevant to an issue in the case and
necessary to clarify or explain the portion received."). Indeed, it is difficult to think of
many other scenarios in which Rule 106 would be useful. Accordingly, Rule 106 would
be significantly undermined if statements offered pursuant to it could be excluded
because they are self-serving.
The fact that the part of a statement proffered under Rule 106 is "temporally
removed" from the part already introduced is also not a valid basis for denying the
proffer. See R.750:8. Rule 106 states:
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse
party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part-or any other
writing or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be considered at the
same time.
Utah R. Evid. 106 (emphases added). The emphasized language demonstrates that the
touchstone of Rule 106 is fairness without regard to the temporal proximity of the
pertinent parts of the statement. As our supreme court has explained, the '"fairness'
standard" requires the admission of any other portion that is '"relevant and necessary to
qualify, explain, or place into context the portion already introduced."' Cruz-Meza, 2003
UT 32, 114 (quoting Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 143). Thus, the question under Rule 106
concerns only the substantive relationship, not the temporal relationship, between the
proffered and already-received parts of the statement. See id.; Leleae, 1999 UT App 368,
,I43. Indeed, it is impossible to see how temporal proximity factors into Rule 106 when

the rule also requires "the introduction ... of any other writing or recorded statement" if
fairness demands it. Utah R. Evid. 106 (emphasis added). Additionally, Cruz-Meza
16

further clarifies that while "temporal[] remote[ ness ]" may be a proper consideration
under the doctrine of oral completeness contained in Rule 611, it is not under Rule 106.

Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 119-14.
In sum, the trial court erred in excluding the part of James 's statement to Reyes in
which James explained why he committed the assault that caused Angela's death. That
part of James's statement was relevant to his theory of extreme emotional distress and it
was necessary to explain, qualify, and put into context the inculpatory parts of the
statement that the prosecution introduced.
B. The trial court's erroneous denial ofJames 's Rule 106 proffer was
prejudicial because it precluded James from presenting his theory of the case.
The trial court's erroneous evidentiary ruling prejudiced James. "An erroneous
decision to exclude evidence constitutes reversible error only if the error is harmful."

State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, 153, 335 P.3d 900. "And 'an error is harmful if it is
~

reasonably likely that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."' Id. (alteration
omitted). However, the error here deprived James of his due process right to present a
complete defense. See Holmes v. S. Carolina, 54 7 U.S. 319, 324 (2006); McCullar, 2014
UT App 215, 1153-59. Because the error "'result[ed] in the deprivation of a constitutional
right, [this Court] [should] apply a higher standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction

Jj

unless [it] find[s] the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Crowley, 2014
UT App 33, 117, 320 P.3d 677. Regardless, the error prejudiced James under either

,.;;

standard.
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Trial errors that preclude a defendant from presenting his theory of the case are
prejudicial. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986); Watters v. Querry, 626
P.2d 455,458 (Utah 1981); Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114, 120-21 (Utah 1942); McCullar,
2014 UT App 215, 1153-59; see also State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13,124, 152 P.3d 315
('" [W]hen an element of the crime is in dispute, and the evidence is consistent with both
the defendant's and the State's theory of the case, failing to instruct on the lesser included
offense presumptively affects the outcome of the trial and our confidence in the verdict is
undermined."' (alteration omitted)); United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196,
1201-02 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The right to have the jury instructed as to the defendant's
theory of the case is one of those rights 'so basic to a fair trial' that failure to instruct
where there is evidence to support the instruction can never be considered harmless
error."). For example, "[w]here there is evidence adduced to support a party's theory of
the case, it is prejudical [sic] error for the trial court to fail to instruct thereon." Watters,
626 P.2d at 458. And, as this Court recently held in McCullar, erroneous evidentiary
rulings are prejudicial when they deprive a defendant of the ability to present his theory
of the case to the jury. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, 1~53-59.
When a trial court's erroneous ruling completely precludes a defendant from
presenting his theory of the case, the jury has no opportunity to find the facts pertaining
to the theory, and an appellate court may not sit as a finder of fact. See Utah Code §§7717-10(1) ("In a jury trial, questions oflaw are to be determined by the court, questions of
fact by the jury."), 78B-5-102 ("All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, ... are to

be decided by the jury, and all evidence is to be addressed to them .... "); State v.
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Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ,i38, 70 P.3d 111 ("We do not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do
we substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder[.]" (internal quotation marks,
citations, and alterations omitted)); State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 116, 25 P.3d 985 ("It is
~

the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility
of the witnesses." (internal quotation marks and emphases omitted)); State v. Rowley,
2008 UT App 233,116, 189 P.3d 109 ("It is within the province of the jury to weigh the
evidence, to decide what weight to give any conflicting evidence, and to make credibility
detenninations; we will not substitute our impressions for the jury's findings on those
matters."). Therefore, in such circumstances, a new trial is required.
Such circumstances exist here. The trial court's erroneous evidentiary ruling
completely precluded James from presenting his theory of the case: he was entitled to
special mitigation because he assaulted Angela under extreme emotional distress caused
by her repeatedly telling him that she was cheating on him with his brother. 4 See Utah
Code §76-5-205.S(l)(b). If the trial court had admitted the proffered evidence as it should
have, James would have been entitled to a jury instruction on special mitigation due to

,;;

extreme emotional distress. Cf State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,,r9-13, 63 P.3d 94; see

also State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, 129, 309 P.3d 1160 ("Each party is entitled to
have the jury instructed on the law applicable to its theory of the case if there is any
reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it. Thus, if a rational jury could find a factual
basis in the evidence to support the theory, the trial court is obligated to give the
~

instruction." (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted)). Furthermore,
4

See supra n.3.
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the jury may well have found special mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence,
thereby reducing James's conviction from murder to manslaughter. See Utah Code §76-5205.5(5). Indeed, the evidence was consistent with James's theory that he acted "under
the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there [was] a reasonable
explanation or excuse." Utah Code §76-5-205.5(1)(b). However, as a result of the trial
court's erroneous ruling, there was no evidence to support James's theory, and the jury
was not instructed on it. Therefore, trial court's error was prejudicial, and a new trial is
required.
II.

The evidence was insufficient to support James's conviction for
obstructing justice because no reasonable jury could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that James concealed, removed, or destroyed evidence
specifically intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder.
This Court will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence when, viewing

"the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict," "the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,I15, 63 P.3d 94. "A
guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Id. ,II 8 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). The Court "cannot take a speculative leap across a remaining
[evidentiary] gap in order to sustain a verdict." Id. "Every element of the crime charged
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Harman, 767 P .2d 567, 568 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). "If the evidence does not support those elements, the verdict must fail."
20

Id. Thus, a verdict fails for insufficient evidence if "the facts shown are reasonably

reconcilable with other [innocent] possibilities," State v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 197, 199
(Utah 1978), or if "reasonable explanations [for the evidence] exist" that are consistent
~

with innocence. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,Il 8. "Culpability can be implied from the
actions and statements of the defendant, but the evidence must be clear enough that the
jury does not have to guess." Harman, 767 P.2d at 569.
"An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay,
or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any
person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense ... alters, destroys, conceals,
or removes any item or other thing." Utah Code §76-8-306(1)(c); cf R.668. Obstructing
justice "is a crime of specific intent." State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,I13, 305 P.3d 1058.
In State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court held that
there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of obstructing justice for
allegedly concealing evidence that her long-term houseguest was sexually abusing her
young daughter. Id. at 1204-05, ajf'd, 852 P.2d 981, 987. There, the defendant knew that,

vJJ

among other things, the guest gave bras and a revealing gymnastics suit to the daughter,
made long-distance phone calls to the daughter when he was away, and was accused of
inappropriately touching the daughter at a pool. Workman, 806 P.2d at 1199-1201, 1204.
The guest had also told the defendant that he wanted to marry the daughter. Id. at 1200,
1204. The State argued that these facts gave rise to an inference that the defendant knew

..;,

of the abuse. Id. at 1204. It further claimed that the defendant was motivated to conceal
the evidence because she shared a joint account with the guest into which the guest
21

deposited hundreds of dollars. Id. The Court disagreed, holding the evidence failed to
show that the defendant "was aware" the guest '\vas sexually exploiting" the daughter
"and that ... she helped him conceal the crime." Id. at 1205. It also concluded that "it
[was] inherently improbable that, even if [the defendant] were aware of the abuse, the
joint bank account would have motivated [her] to conceal [the guest's] abuse of her
daughter.'· Id. It noted the undisputed evidence that the defendant reprimanded the guest
whenever she believed he was acting inappropriately with the daughter and cooperated
with the police once they informed her that the guest was under investigation. Id. at 120405.
Workman appears to be the only Utah case finding the evidence insufficient to

support a conviction for obstructing justice. But see Bingham, 575 P.2d at 199 (holding
that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of second degree felony
obstructing justice, but sufficient to convict defendant of class B misdemeanor
obstructing justice). However, there are at least three Utah cases finding the evidence
insufficient to support evidence tampering, a crime very similar to the variation of
obstructing justice charged in this case and with a similar specific intent. See Shumway,
2002 UT 124, ififl5-18; State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ,r,r11-20, 2 P.3d 954; State
v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 569 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). These cases are instructive.

In Shumway, the defendant, Shumway, stabbed the victim thirty-nine times.
Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,r2. The police found a knife that they believed was used in the

stabbing, but the medical examiner determined that some of the victim's wounds were
caused by a second implement, which was never found. Id. In addition to a murder
22

charge, the State charged Shumway with evidence tampering for allegedly concealing the
\@

second implement. Id.

112-3, 15. He was convicted. Id. 13.

On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, Shumway claimed that the evidence was
~

insufficient to support his conviction for evidence tampering. Id. ~15. In response, the
State argued that there were three key pieces of evidence supporting the conviction: (I)
there was approximately an hour of unaccounted for time in which Shumway could have
disposed of the second implement; (2) Shumway had moved some other items,
specifically blankets and socks, that had blood on them as a result of the stabbing; and (3)
several months after the stabbing, Shumway wrote in a journal entry, "'Do they know
what kind of knife is the other."' Id. 117. The court was unpersuaded by the State's
argument. Id. 118. It stated: "At most, the evidence supports only the proposition that
[Shumway] had the opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it
ever existed .... Other reasonable explanations exist why the instrument was not found ..
. . Only speculation supports the conviction." Id. Holding that the evidence was
insufficient, the court reversed Shumway's conviction and dismissed the charge. Id. 119.
In Gonzales, the defendant, Gonzales, was riding in the backseat of a car from
which the driver fired shots at another automobile. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ~3.
After seeing police while stopped at a traffic light, the driver tossed the gun into the glove
compartment. Id.

14. But when police pulled the car over based on a report of the

shooting, they found the gun behind the glove compartment. Id.

115-6. They also found

marijuana underneath the backseat and an extra ammunition clip for the gun in
Gonzales's pocket. Id. ~6. Gonzales admitted that the marijuana was his. Id. The State
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charged Gonzales with evidence tampering, alleging that he hid the marijuana or
encouraged or aided the driver in hiding the gun. Id. ~'if7-9. Gonzales was convicted. Id.

On appeal to this Court, Gonzales challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction. Id. ~I 0. As a preliminary matter, the Court held that the
applicable evidence tampering statute required Gonzales to have concealed the evidence
believing that an investigation was pending or imminent. Id. ~15. Regarding the gun, the
State argued that the clip in Gonzales's pocket "tied" him to the gun, so he must have
encouraged the driver to hide the gun. Id. 'ifl 7. The Court quickly disposed of this
argument, noting simply that "the State presented no evidence to support this inference."
Id. Alternatively, the State argued that Gonzales "took the extra clip to disperse evidence

and thus assisted in misdirecting the police." Id. 'if I 8. The Court stated, "it is just as
possible, absent any evidence presented by the State, that [Gonzales] had the clip in his
pocket" prior to the shooting. Id. The Court concluded, "by merely establishing
[Gonzales]'s possession of the extra clip, the State did not present sufficient evidence
from which the jury could infer timing, concealment, and intent to conceal the gun
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
Regarding the marijuana, the State argued that Gonzales's admission to owning
the marijuana and the fact that "it was found under the back seat" gave rise to a
reasonable inference that Gonzales concealed the marijuana believing an investigation
was imminent. Id. 'if I 9. The Court was unpersuaded. Id. ~20. At trial, Gonzales argued
that he put the marijuana under the seat before the shooting. Id. Because the State failed
24

to produce any evidence that Gonzales put the marijuana under the seat after the
shooting, the Court held that the evidence failed to establish that Gonzales "hid the
marijuana believing an investigation was going to occur and in order to impede the
@

investigation." Id. Accordingly, the Court reversed. Id. ,I2 l.
Finally, in Harman, the defendant, Harman, was chief of the investigations
division of a county attorney's office. Harman, 767 P.2d at 567. He was tasked with

~

investigating the origin of a fire that damaged a mall. Id. The county's mental health
offices were located in the mall. Id. Harman enlisted Ralph Tolman and Jim Ashby to
separately investigate the fire and prepare reports. Id. at 567-68. Dean Larsen, the
assistant chief of a local fire department, also investigated the fire. Id. at 567. Larsen and
Tolman both concluded that the fire originated inside the mental health offices, while
Ashby concluded it did not. Id. at 567-68. Harman, however, rejected Tolman's report
after sending a copy of it to the "supervisor of the county attorney's civil division, and
possibly several others." Id. at 568. After "Larsen disclosed the existence of [Tolman's]
report during a deposition conducted pursuant to a civil suit over [the county's] liability

va

for the fire," Harman was charged with attempted evidence tampering for rejecting the
report. Id.
At trial, the prosecution relied on evidence of Harman's out-of-court statement
that "the report would make the county look bad, cost the county millions, and make the
county liable." Id. at 569. Harman, on the other hand, testified that he rejected the report
because it "'parroted"' Larsen's opinion, "contained unsupported factual assertions, and
was a 'bad report."' Id. Hannan was convicted. Id. at 567.
25

On appeal, this Court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to convict Hannan.
Id. at 569. It noted that Harman made no attempt to conceal or destroy copies of the
report that he had given to other people. Id. It concluded that the State failed to present
any evidence that Harman rejected the report for improper reasons and not simply
because it was a bad report. Id. The Court said, "[c]ulpability can be implied from the
actions and statements of the defendant, but the evidence must be clear enough that the
jury does not have to guess." Id. It held that the evidence of Hannan's guilt "was so
slight, so conflicting, and so inherently improbable that reasonable minds could not have"
found him guilty. Id.
The relevant evidence supporting James's obstructing justice conviction, in the
light most favorable to the verdict, is the following. 5

I. When Reyes asked James "ifhe attempted to clean it up at all," James said that,
before Angela lost consciousness for the last time, he tried to clean her with
hydrogen peroxide and water in the bathtub in order to awaken her and render her
first aid. R.749:95-96, 122-24, 144.
2. On a dresser in the bedroom where Angela's body was found, police found an
empty hydrogen peroxide bottle with no cap. R.749:19-20; State's Ex. 51. Det.
Todd Park testified that the hydrogen peroxide bottle was "larger ... than what I'd
normally have at my house." R.749:20. But see State's Ex. 51 (depicting a fairly
standard hydrogen peroxide bottle). He also testified that hydrogen peroxide is for
cleaning wounds. R.749:30.
3. On the bedroom floor where Angela's body was found, police found an empty
spray bottle that had contained an antiseptic solution for disinfecting wounds,
some empty water bottles, an empty pink washbasin that had some blood smears
inside of it, open gauze packaging, and some used gauze, wet with blood and
water, near Angela's body. R.749:18, 20-22, 28; State's Exs. 52-53, 55-57.

5

See Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(9); State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,i,J40-44, 326 P.3d 645.
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4. In the bedroom, there was some blood that appeared to be diluted on the walls and
on a lightswitch. R.749:24, 26; State's Exs. 60-61, 63. A hamper in the bedroom
contained a bunch of towels and clothing that was wet with blood and water.
R.749: 17, 19; State's Ex. 50. There was a white towel with blood on it on the
floor. R.749:21; State's Ex. 55. There were bloodstains throughout the bedroom
and bathroom. R.749:17-24, 39; State's Exs. 7A, 50-68B, 75.
5. Blood had been washed down the drain of the bathtub and the bathroom sink.
R.749:33-38; State's Exs. 66A-67B. There were traces of blood on the bathroom
floor. R.749:33-37; State's Exs. 68A-68B.
6. After Angela lost consciousness for the last time, James laid down next to her and
slept for an hour or two. R.749:92, 98. Soon after he woke up, he called Roger to
come pick him up. R.748:91-93; 749:92-93. It took Roger approximately twentyfive minutes to arrive. R.748:94. Roger waited for James for approximately five to
ten minutes. R.748:94-95. Before James left with Roger, he called the police.
R.748:125-27; 749:92-93. He left the door open for them on his way out of the
apartment. R.748:76-77; 749:28.
7. When Roger and James got to Roger's house, James said he needed a nap.
R.748:102. Roger told him to take his pants off because they had blood on them.
R.748: 102. James took his pants off and he and Roger took a nap in Roger's bed.
R.748:102-03.
8. When James emerged from Roger's house to tum himself in to the police, he was
not wearing pants or socks. R. 749 :9. The police found James' s pants and socks in
plain view in Roger's bedroom. R.749:7-8; State's Exs. 41-45. They had blood on
them. R.749:7-8; State's Exs. 41-45. James's wallet containing his social security
card was in a pocket of the pants. R.749:8; State's Exs. 43-44.
The jury was instructed to find James guilty of obstructing justice only if he
"altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed any item or other thing ... with intent to
hinder, delay or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or
punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense ... AND
... the defendant's conduct constituted the criminal offense of murder." R.668; cf Utah
Code §76-8-306(1 )( c). Thus, James could be convicted of obstructing justice only if he
concealed, removed, or destroyed evidence specifically intending to hinder the
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investigation of Angela's murder. See State v. Steed, 2014 UT 16, ~52-55, 325 P.3d 87
(holding that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must be evaluated in light of
the applicable statute "as the statute was presented in the jury instructions"). From the
evidence, the jury could not have reasonably concluded that James did so.
There was no evidence that James planned to kill Angela. All the evidence was to
the contrary. 6 In fact, James was uncertain that Angela was dead until Reyes told him that
she was. R.748:97; 749:139, 141. Therefore, James's obstructingjustice conviction
cannot be based on conduct that occurred before Angela died. In this case, as in

Gonzales, timing was critical: the prosecution needed to prove that James concealed
evidence with the requisite specific intent after Angela died. 7 It failed.
The prosecution presented no evidence that James cleaned Angela or the
apartment after she died. It produced no evidence of when the supposedly diluted blood
smears formed on the wall, when the pile of towels and clothes wet with blood and water
was created, when the hydrogen peroxide bottle and antiseptic spray bottle were emptied,
or when blood was washed down the drain in the bathtub and bathroom sink. Moreover,
the prosecution's allegation that James intended to hinder the investigation was belied by
the fact that bloodstains pervaded the crime scene and James himself called the police
and left the door open for them. Cf Harman, 767 P.2d at 569 (finding the evidence
insufficient in part because Harman did not attempt to conceal or destroy copies of the

The prosecution acknowledged this. R.750:98.
The prosecution implicitly acknowledged this by arguing that James was guilty of
obstructing justice because he cleaned Angela and the apartment after Angela died but
before he left with Roger. R.750:65-66, 72-73, 96.

6

7
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report he gave to other people). The evidence, even viewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict, was consistent with James' s explanation that he cleaned Angela before she
died to prevent her from losing consciousness and render her first aid. Cf id.; Gonzales,
~

2000 UT App 136, ,I20; Workman, 806 P.2d at 1204-05. In arguing its case, the
prosecution simply encouraged the jury to disbelieve James's explanation and to
speculate that James tried to clean the crime scene sometime after Angela died but before
he left with Roger. R.750:65-66, 72-73, 96; cf Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 1~17-18 (holding
that the evidence was insufficient because at best it supported the inference that
Shumway had ''the opportunity" to dispose of the second implement, not that he did so);

Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ,I20 (holding that the evidence was insufficient because
Gonzales testified that he put the marijuana under the seat before the shooting and the
State did not produce any evidence to the contrary); Harman, 767 P.2d at 569 (holding
that the evidence was insufficient because it was consistent with Hannan's explanation
that he rejected the report because it was a bad report). Therefore, the evidence
purporting to show that James cleaned Angela or the apartment cannot sustain his
~

conviction.
Even if one could reasonably infer that James at some point planned to ultimately
kill Angela, the evidence purporting to show that James cleaned Angela and the
apartment before she died is insufficient to show that he concealed evidence specifically
intending to hinder the investigation of her murder. James explained to Reyes that he

~

cleaned Angela to prevent her from losing consciousness and render her first aid, and the
prosecution presented no evidence to the contrary. Cf Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ,20;
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Harman, 767 P.2d at 569. Nor did the prosecution present any evidence of how the
supposedly diluted blood stains formed on the wall, under what circumstances the pile of
towels and clothes wet with blood and water was created, under what circumstances the
hydrogen peroxide bottle and antiseptic spray bottle were emptied, or under what
circumstances blood was washed down the drain in the bathtub and bathroom sink. It
would be speculative to conclude that James concealed or destroyed evidence specifically
intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder before Angela died. See

Harman, 767 P.2d at 569 ("Culpability can be implied from the actions and statements of
the defendant, but the evidence must be clear enough that the jury does not have to
guess."). Thus, even if conduct occurring before Angela's death theoretically could
sustain the verdict, on this record it fails to do so.
Nor can James's conviction be sustained by the fact that he left his pants and socks
inside Roger's bedroom when he turned himself in. 8 There was no evidence that James
concealed his pants and socks with the specific intent to hinder the investigation.
Furthermore, the evidence supports the conclusion that James did not intend to hinder the
investigation. Roger told James to take his pants off before getting into bed to take a nap
because they had blood on them, and James obeyed. In all probability, he removed his
socks as well, since they had blood on them, too. When James turned himself in to the
police, he left his pants and socks in plain view in Roger's bedroom; he did not conceal
them. The pants and socks still had blood on them. When the police searched Roger's
house after James turned himself in, they easily found the pants and socks. R.749:7-8;
8

Notably, the prosecution never argued that it could.
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State's Exs. 41-45. The pants were on a chair and the socks were on the floor next to the
chair. R.749:7-8; State's Exs. 41-45. A pocket in the pants contained James's wallet,
which had his social security card in it. And shortly after James turned himself in, he
~

confessed to the assault that caused Angela's death. All of this evidence weighs heavily
against the proposition that James concealed his pants and socks in Roger's bedroom
specifically intending to hinder the investigation into Angela's murder.
The prosecutor suggested that the jury could find James guilty of obstructing
justice because he wore the bloody pants and socks when he traveled from the apartment
to Roger's house. R.750:66-67. This suggestion is absurd. The evidence indicates that
James was wearing the pants and socks during the assault. One cannot reasonably infer
specific intent to hinder the investigation from the mere fact that James did not change
clothes when he left the apartment. On the contrary, if James really wanted to hinder the
investigation, he would have changed into clean pants and socks. That would have made
it somewhat more difficult for the police to tie him to Angela's death. In short, the
prosecution presented no evidence that James wore the pants and socks with a specific

~

intent to hinder the investigation. That's because James only wore them for the usual
purpose: to cover his legs and feet.
In sum, there was no evidence that James ever concealed or destroyed evidence
specifically intending to hinder the investigation of Angela's murder. Even viewed in a
light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was "sufficiently inconclusive [and]

<.&)

inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that [James] committed [obstruction of justice]." Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ,Il5. The
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evidence was not "clear enough that the jury [did] not have to guess" about James's
culpability. Harman, 767 P.2d at 569. It failed to eliminate reasonable possibilities
consistent with innocence. See Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 118; Bingham, 575 P.2d at 199;
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, 118. Instead, the prosecution exhorted the jury to "take a

speculative leap across ... gap[s]" in the evidence, and the jury obliged. Shumway, 2002
UT 124, 118.
This issue is preserved. R.750:35-38. But to the extent the Court believes it is not,
it should review the issue for plain error. See State v. Mohamed, 2012 UT App 183, 13,
282 P.3d 1066. "When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under the plain error
doctrine, 'a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support
a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitted the case to the jury."' Id. (quoting State

v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,117, 10 P.3d 346).
For reasons already mentioned, the evidence was insufficient to support James' s
obstructing justice conviction. The prosecution presented "no evidence" that James
concealed, removed, or destroyed evidence specifically intending to hinder the
investigation into Angela's murder. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 117. Therefore, the
insufficiency of the evidence was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in
submitting the obstructing justice charge to the jury. Id.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, James asks the Court to reverse his conviction for
murder and remand for a new trial on that charge. He further asks the Court to reverse his
viJ

conviction for obstructing justice and dismiss that charge for insufficient evidence.
SUBMITTED this

i:?i1

day of January, 2015.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 111903659 FS
Judge :
DENISE P LINDBERG
Date:
July 14, 2014

JAMES RAPHAEL SANCHEZ,
Defendant.
custody: USP

PRESENT
Clerk:
shanadw
Prosecutor: BOEHM, MICHAEL P
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELLAPIANA, RALPH
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 4, 1987
Sheriff Office#: 293137
Audio
Tape Number:
CR N45
Tape Count: 2:53CHARGES
l. MURDER - 1st Degree
Plea: Not Guilty
2. OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE
Plea: Not Guilty

Felony
- Disposition: 05/22/2014 Guilty
- 2nd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 05/22/2014 Guilty

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE

Terms are in run Concurrent with each other. Consecutive to case
111903658. Pay Restitution to the Board of Pardons, Crime Victim
Reparations. Mr. Boehm to prepare and submit to the Court amount of
Restitution owed.

Printed: 07/16/14 09:23:38

Page 1
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Case No: 111903659 Date:

Jul 14, 2014

ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
JAMES SANCHEZ
YOUNG SLEEPY BROWN
YOUNG SLEEPY

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE

CUSTODY

The defendant is present in the custody of the Department of
Corrections Utah State Prison - Draper.
Date:

0
Printed: 07/16/14 09:23:38

Page 2 (last)
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Tab B

UTAH CODE§ 76-5-203 (2012)

§ 76-5-203. Murder
,.;;

( 1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:
(a) a clandestine drug lab violation under Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18
years of age;
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;

~

(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;

(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;

VD

(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section
76-5-404.1;
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402;
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;

(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405;
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102;
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301;
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302;
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309; or
(v) a felony violation of Section 76-10-508 or 76-10-508.1 regarding discharge of a
fireann or dangerous weapon.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the
actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and
thereby causes the death of another;

(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to

the predicate offense;
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of
the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or
attempted commission of any predicate offense; and
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate offense;

~

(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer or military service member in
uniform while in the commission or attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4;
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section
76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; or
(iii) an assault against a military service member in uniform under Section 76-5-102.4;
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or

(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under
Section 76-5-205.5.

(3)(a) Murder is a first degree felony.
(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which may be for life.

(4 )(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the
defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another under a
reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for the
conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing
circumstances.

(b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a) shall be determined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(c) This affirmative defense reduces charges only from:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and

(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.

(5)(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense
does not merge with the crime of murder.
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense described in
Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and punished
for, the separate offense.

UTAH CODE§ 76-5-205.5 (2012)
§ 76-5-205.5. Special mitigation reducing the level of criminal homicide
offense--Burden of proof--Application to reduce offense

(1) Special mitigation exists when the actor cau_ses the death of another or attempts to
cause the death of another:

(a)(i) under circumstances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts under a
delusion attributable to a mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305;
(ii) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts existed as the defendant
believed them to be in the delusional state, those facts would provide a legal
justification for the defendant's conduct; and
(iii) the defendant's actions, in light of the delusion, were reasonable from the
objective viewpoint of a reasonable person; or
(b) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse.
(2) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or
ingested alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged
offense may not claim mitigation of the offense under Subsection {l){a) on the basis of
mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, triggered, or substantially contributed to
the mental illness.
(3) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional distress does not include:
(a) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or
(b) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.

(4) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (l)(b) shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing
circumstances.

(5)(a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as listed in Subsection (5)(b) are
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation under
this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall return a verdict on
the reduced charge as provided in Subsection ( 5)(b ).
(b) If under Subsection (5)(a) the offense is:
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of murder;
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of
attempted murder;

(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of manslaughter; or
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of attempted
manslaughter.

(6)(a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the jury is required to establish the
existence of the special mitigation.
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall return a verdict
on the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5).
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special mitigation has not been
established, it shall convict the defendant of the greater offense for which the
prosecution has established all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
( d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether or not special mitigation has
been established, the result is a hung jury.

~

(7)(a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the trier of fact, it shall return a
special verdict indicating whether the existence of special mitigation has been found.
(b) The trier of fact shall return the special verdict at the same time as the general
verdict, to indicate the basis for its general verdict.
(8) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any case, reduce the level of an
offense by more than one degree from that offense, the elements of which the evidence
has established beyond a reasonable doubt.

UTAH CODE§ 76-8-306 (2012)
§ 76-8-306. Obstruction of justice in criminal investigations or proceedings
--Elements--Penalties--Exceptions

(1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay, or
prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any
person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense:

(a) provides any person with a weapon;
(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from performing any act
that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment
of any person;
(c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing;
(d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be false;
(e) harbors or conceals a person;
( f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding
discovery or apprehension;
(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension;
(h) warns any person of an order authorizing the interception of wire communications
or of a pending application for an order authorizing the interception of wire
communications;
(i) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the offense, after a
judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the information; or

G) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct constituting an
offense, or any other material aspect of the investigation.

(2)(a) As used in this section, "conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" means
conduct that would be punishable as a crime and is separate from a violation of this
section, and includes:
(i) any violation of a criminal statute or ordinance of this state, its political
subdivisions, any other state, or any district, possession, or territory of the United
States; and
(ii) conduct committed by a juvenile which would be a crime if committed by an
adult.

(b) A violation of a criminal statute that is committed in another state, or any district,
possession, or territory of the United States, is a:
(i) capital felony if the penalty provided includes death or life imprisonment without

parole;
(ii) a first degree felony if the penalty provided includes life imprisonment with
parole or a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding 15 years;
(iii) a second degree felony if the penalty provided exceeds five years;
(iv) a third degree felony if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any
period exceeding one year; and
(v) a misdemeanor if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period of
one year or less.
(3) Obstruction of justice is:
(a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitutes an offense would be a
capital felony or first degree felony;

(b) a third degree felony if:
(i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second or third degree felony
and the actor violates Subsection (l)(b), (c), (d), (e), or (f);

(ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any offense other than a capital
or first degree felony and the actor violates Subsection (l)(a);
(iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed before a court of law; or
(iv) a violation of Subsection ( I )(h); or
(c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not enumerated under
Subsection (3)(a) or (b).

(4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the conduct
constituting an offense.
(5) Subsection (l)(e) does not apply to harboring a youth offender, which is governed by
Section 62A-7-402.

(6) Subsection ( I )(b) does not apply to:
(a) tampering with a juror, which is governed by Section 76-8-508.5;
(b) influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member of the Board of
Pardons and Parole, which is governed by Section 76-8-316;
(c) tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe, which is governed by
Section 76-8-508;
(d) retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant, which is governed by Section
76-8-508.3; or

(e) extortion or bribery to dismiss a criminal proceeding, which is governed by Section
76-8-509.
(7) Notwithstanding Subsection (1 ), (2), or (3), an actor commits a third degree felony if
the actor harbors or conceals an offender who has escaped from official custody as
defined in Section 76-8-309.

r\fi,I

UTAH R. EVID.106
RULE 106. REMAINDER OF OR RELATED WRITINGS OR RECORDED
STATEMENTS
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse
party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.
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1

THE COURT: Okay -

2

MR. BOEHM: He didn't - I can voir dire the witness

3

and we can direct (inaudible).

4

{inaudible).

5

Jenkins (inaudible).

6

We can even recall him from

We never introduced a statement of Angela

MR. DELLAPIANA: I've got some other things while

7

we're standing here.

8

examine is more than adequate for this situation, but Rule

9

106, the completeness rule, when a party introduces part of a

10
11

I'm convinced that the right to cross

recorded statement - this was a recorded statement THE COURT: I do (inaudible), the completeness rule

12

speaks to completing that statement, where only a fragment of

13

the statement is brought in, not to bring in something that

14

is pages away from the statement that -

15

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

I disagree.

16

THE COURT: - was allegedly brought in.

17

MR. DELLAPIANA: I disagree.

18

THE COURT: - as I see the completeness rule is, if

19

you're asking someone to read a fraction of a statement, and

20

that statement on its own or that - without introducing the

21

complete - that whole complete statement, it leaves a

22

misleading indication, then the completeness rule applies.

23

But, to seek -

So -

Q

24

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

I - that's where we are.

25

THE COURT: No, we're talking about something that
128

1

you're telling him is page - something arising on page 8.

2

This statement - the statement you were referencing is,

3

being told is on page 24.

4

in front of me.

5

completeness rule applies.

I don't know,

But, based on that,

I don't have those

I don't believe that the

6

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well ...

7

THE COURT: So, if that's your basis -

8

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

9

I'm

I'm going to ask the question

in a different way.

10

THE COURT: Well -

11

MR. DELLAPIANA: If he wants to -

12

THE COURT: - you better clear it through me.

13

MR. BOEHM: Yeah, I would ask for that (inaudible)

14

that he can't just (inaudible).
THE COURT: Yeah.

15

16

tainting the jury.

17

to ask.

18

No.

I don't - I don't want this

You tell me what it is that you're going

MR. DELLAPIANA: Okay.

Well,

I'm going to ask a

19

question regarding Mr. Sanchez's explanation for the - for

20

the assault.

21

THE COURT: Then -

22

MR. BOEHM:

23

MR. DELLAPIANA: This is something that goes to his

(Inaudible) -

24

own statement.

Regardless of the truth of whether - of

25

anything she said, he believed 129

1

THE COURT: Then it doesn't - but it's not a

2

statement against the party.

3

arguably self serving.

It's his own statement that is

4

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, that's for the jury to -

5

THE COURT: If he wants to take the stand and say

6

it, then that's fine.

But -

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well, tell you what, we can spend

7

8

the rest of the afternoon with me cross examining this guy on

9

the record and send it up on appeal then, because that's the

10

defense.

11

That's our defense.
MR. BOEHM: I mean, we filed a motion in limine that

12

was - talked about the 412, we talked about this yesterday,

13

everybody knew that this was going to be a tactic that might

14

be employed, but I think that everybody has to recognize that

15

either one doesn't allow the statement unless it's offered

16

against (inaudible), defense counsel represents the defendant

17

(inaudible) cannot ask this witness -

18

MR. DELLAPIANA: I think we used that argument.

19

THE COURT: Yes, you did.

20

MR. DELLAPIANA: I'm -

(inaudible), I specifically

21

said,

22

to introduce a statement of my client.

23

I am not using a party opponent language rule as a way
I -

THE COURT: That's true, what you said is that you

24

would elicit it through somebody else's testimony.

25

I said to you is,

And what

if you're seeking to introduce it through

130
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1

somebody else,

it needs to be consistent with the rules of

2

evidence, and it cannot be a statement of the individual.

3

said - and I also said that if you, you know,

4

the right to testify, he clearly has a right not to testify.

5

But,

6

it on the basis of hearsay.

I

clearly he has

if he - if you want to put that in, you're not eliciting

MR. DELLAPIANA: Well,

7

tell you what, Your Honor.

I

8

will attempt to ask some different questions about different

9

things, and then when I'm done with what is hopefully

10

unobjectionable testimony,

11

everybody's attention that I'm ready to make -

12

13

I ' l l either -

I ' l l bring it to

THE COURT: We will discuss this off the record with
the jury - out of the presence -

14

MR. DELLAPIANA: Yeah.

15

THE COURT: - of -

16

MR. BOEHM: Well, and my concern is that - I mean,

Okay.

17

the Court's asking what he - what defense counsel intends to

18

ask, because defense counsel seems unfortunately opposed to

19

the Court's ruling, and I think -

20

MR. DELLAPIANA: True.

21

MR. BOEHM: Right?

Anyway, go ahead.

And I think the issue is,

22

there's a very big difference between what

23

yesterday when the State asked a question and got an

24

unexpected response,

25

question.

(inaudible)

it was not elicited by the State's

And defense counsel thinks he's going to say,

131

1

Well, what did defendant say about this?

(Inaudible) say

2

about this, and explain that it - the cat's out of the bag,

3

and he's done it intentionally, and knowing that it's not

4

admissible, that it's hearsay and that it can't be used.

5

I would ask for a warning that he not do that.

So

6

THE COURT: Don't tempt me, Mr. Dellapiana.

7

MR. DELLAPIANA: I can't - I'll tell you - I'm going

8

9

to do my best THE COURT: Your responsibility is - you need to -

10

your responsibility is to put in, if you wish to put in

11

evidence that would support a - by a preponderance of the

12

evidence a standard that you've (inaudible) on some basis.

13

MR. DELLAPIANA: Sure.

14

THE COURT: Admissible evidence.

15

MR. DELLAPIANA: Right.

16

THE COURT: But, you're not going to be introducing

17

or leading into something that would be objectionable

18

statements.

19

MR. DELLAPIANA: We'll see.

20

THE COURT: Just to get that on the record -

21

MR. DELLAPIANA: I will try.

22

THE COURT: - that will not happen.

23

MR. DELLAPIANA: I will try not to do that.

24

THE COURT: No.

25

MR. DELLAPIANA: I may end up the afternoon with my

No.

You will not do that.
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1

client in custody, but not on trial.

2

(End of sidebar)

3

MR. BOEHM: Your Honor,

can we just make a finding

4

that the State has objected based on the hearsay and hear

5

what the Court's ruling on that THE COURT: The State has objected; I have sustained

6
7

the objection.
MR. BOEHM: Thank you, Your Honor.

8

9

10

Q

This cross examination

may be shorter than I intended.

11

12

(BY MR. DELLAPIANA) Okay.

The length of the fight - you asked him about how
long the fight went on.

13

A

I did.

14

Q

And he said it was for a couple of hours.

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

You described it as last - him saying another time

17

it was last night.

18

A

I do.

19

Q

Okay,

Do you remember that?

is that fair to - for most people that can

20

mean sometime before dawn?

21

happened last night,

22

A

I -

23

Q

All right.

I mean, we refer to - oh, it

could be in the middle of the night.

I would assume so.

Yeah.

You asked him about - he told you that

24

he had choked her and that she kind of lost consciousness,

25

right?
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile such conflict as far as you
reasonably can. But where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and must
detennine from the evidence what the facts are. There are no definite rules governing how you

shall determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or how you shall determine what
the facts are in this case. But you should carefully and conscientiously consider and compare all
of the testimony, and all of the facts and circumstances, which have a bearing on any issue, in
order to determine what the facts are.

. ,·
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INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf and has the
right to go upon the witness stand and testify if he chooses to do so. However, the law expressly
provides that no preswnption adverse to him is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place
himself upon the witness stand.
In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to rely on the state of the
evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the State to prove every essential element of the charge
against him. The fact that this defendant has not availed himself of the privilege which the law
gives him should not prejudice him in any way. It should not be considered as any indication of
either his guilt or his innocence.

1. 5 2

Q

INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness on his own behalf. The
defendant's testimony should be received and given the same consideration as you give to that of

any witness. The fact that the defendant stands accused of a crime is no evidence of his guilt and
no reason for rejecting his testimony. However, you should weigh the defendant's testimony the
same as you weigh the testimony of any other witness.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror.
It is the duty of each of you after considering all the evidence in the case, to determine, if
possible, the question of guilty or innocence of the defendant. When you have reached a
conclusion in that respect you should not change it merely because one or more of all of your
fellow jurors may have come to a different conclusion. However, the jurors should freely and
fairly discuss the evidence and the deductions to be drawn therefrom. If, after doing so, any juror
should be satisfied that a conclusion first reached was wrong, the juror unhesitatingly should
abandon that original opinion and render the juror's verdict according to the final decision.

1. 5 4

Q
INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can find the defendant, James Raphael Sanchez, of the offense of Obstruction
of Justice, as charged in Count II of the Information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each one of the following elements of that offense, occurring on or
about the 5th day of May, 2011, in Salt Lake County, Utah:

1. That the _defendant, James Raphael Sanchez:
(a)

prevented by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from
performing any act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension,
pros~on, C01'viction, or punishment of any person; or

(b)

altered, -qesti:<?Yed, concealeds or removed any item or o$er thing;

2. The. the defendant acted with intent to hinder, delay, or pr~ent the investigation,
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding
conduct that constitutes a criminal offense;
3. The defendant's conduct constituted the criminal offense ofmmder.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of each one of the foregoing elements, then you must find the
defendant Ouilty of Obstructing Justice as charged in Count II of the Information. If, on the
other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant Not Guilty as to Count II.

1.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Under the law of the State of Utah. strangulation CODStitutes "serious bodily injury."
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INSTRUCTION NO.
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one of your members to act as
foreperson, who, as foreperson, will preside over your deliberations.
Your verdict in this case must be either:
As to Count I:

Guilty of Murder; or
Not Guilty of Murder.
As to Count II:

Guilty of Obstruction of Justice; or
Not Guilty of Obstruction of Justice.
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all jurors is required to find a
verdict. Your verdict must be in writing, and when found, must be signed and dated by your
foreperson and then returned by you to this court. When your verdict has been found, notify the
bailiff that you are ready to report to the court.

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ __, 20

.

JUDGE
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-CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

~

day of September, 2013, true and correct copies of the

foregoing PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS were made available to the
attorney listed below for the defendant by hand delivery.

Ralph Dellapiana
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF RECEIPT
I hereby certify that I, (please print name) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,
acknowledge receiving the above described PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS on the __ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __, 2_, and further certify
that this Certificate of Receipt was signed for at the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
or returned the Certificate of Receipt via facsimile transmission to the Salt Lake County District
Attorney's Office at 801-531-4110 on the __ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,
2

--
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9/10/13

UtalP!fiate Courts Mail- Tagalog Interpreter for jurylrlal - 111903?llt'

Tagalog interpreter for jury trial -111903659
i message
Evangelina Burrows <evangelinab@utcourts.gov.>
To: Kristin Ferguson <kristlnff@utcourts.gov.>

Tue, Sep 10, 2013at 11:20AM

A Tagalog interpreter has been requested by the DA's office for a witness In case 111903659, which Is set for trial
on Sept 17. Nella Justiniano will be Interpret on that date, but must leaw by 3:00 pm because she teaches a
class in Pro\O.
I'm still trying to find a second Tagalog interpreter to help with this jury trial.

https:J/mail.google.com'rreiUii0/7ul::2&ilFbtm99227b&\4ewa<pt&search=lnbolt&.lh=14108e380a7cbdc7
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RALPH DELLAPIANA (6861)
TRENTON RICKS (7770)
Attorneys for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 I 1
Telephone: 532-5444

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
fN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
QUESTIONS TO THE JURY
PANEL ON VOIR DIRE

THE ST ATE OF UT AH,
Plaintiff,
V.

JAMES RAPHAEL SANCHEZ,

Case No. l 11903659 FS
JUDGE DENISE LINDBERG

Defendant.

The defendant, James Sanchez, by and through his attorneys of record, respectfully
submits the following interrogatories for the voir dire of the prospective jurors in the above-numbered
case.
GENERAL INFORMATION
I.

Where are you employed?

2.

What are your duties there?

3.

How long have you been so employed?

4.

Do you have any plans for a change of employment in the near future?

5.

Have you had any different type of employment for a significant period of time?

6.

What is your marital status?

160

7.

Where is your spouse employed?

8.

What are his or her duties at that place of employment?

9.

Please state your race.

10.

Do you have any children? If so:
State the age and sex of each of these children.
Which of these children reside with you?
Are any of these adult children employed? If so:
Describe the nature and length of this employment.

11.

Do you belong to any clubs or organizations? If so:
What clubs or organizations do you belong to?

12.

What are your hobbies and leisure time activities?

13.

What do you rely on for your sources of information, i.e., newspapers, magazines,
television, radio, or word of mouth?

14.

Do you subscribe to any publications (including newspapers)? If so: which ones?

15.

Have you lived in any place other than Salt Lake County for any length of time?
If so:

Where did you live before you came here?
Why did you decide to move to Salt Lake County?
16.

Have any of you ever served in the Armed Forces?

17.

What is your educationaJ background?

18.

What subject did you major in if colJege education?

19.

Do any of you have any close friends or relatives who are lawyers who practice

GI

criminal law or who, in the past, practiced criminal law?
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What is the name of that friend or relative?
Where does he or she practice law?
Would this prevent you in any way in following the instructions on the Jaw as
v;)

given to you by this court?
20.

Do any of you know the attorneys in this case?

21.

Do any of you know any of the State's or defense witnesses?

22.

Do any of you know the defendant, James Sanchez, or any member of his family?

23.

Do you know anyone employed at the Salt Lake County District Attorney's

~

office?
,..;J

EXPERIENCE WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT
24.

Have any of you ever been emp]oyed in any sort of law enforcement capacity? If
so, when and where?

25.

Do any of you have c1osc friends or relatives who have been employed by any law
enforcement agency?
If so, name the friend or re]ation and the agency he or she worked for.
Wou]d this relationship in any way affect your ability to sit on this jury in a fair

and impartial manner?
26. Are there any of you who would tend to give more credibility or weight to the
testimony of a police officer merely because he or she is a police officer, than you
would to any other witness?
3

tei

PRJOR JURY AND WITNESS EXPERlENCE
27.

Have any of you ever served on a jury before? If so:
What type of case was it?
When was the trial?
Were you the foreperson?
What was the verdict?
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on this jury in a fair and
impartial manner?

28.

Have any of you ever been called as a witness in court before? If so:
What type of case was it?
What was the trial or hearing?
When was the trial or hearing?
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on this jury in a fair and
impartial manner?

PRIOR EXPERIENCE AS A VICTIM OF OR
WITNESS TO CRIME OR AS A DEFENDANT
29.

Have any of you or your close friends or relatives ever been the victim of a

criminal offense? lf so:
What was the nature of the offense?
Was anybody charged, arrested or convicted of that offense?
4
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(;)

Would that experience affect your ability to serve on this jury in a fair and
impartial manner?
30.

Have any of you or your close friends or relatives ever been accused of a crime
before? If so:
What was the nature of the charge?
What was the final disposition of the case?
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on this jury in a fair and
impartial manner?

3 I.

Have any of you, your close friends, or relatives ever been a witness to a crime?
If, so, please describe.

Was that a traumatic experience?
Would that experience affect your ability to be a fair and impartial juror in this
case?

ABILITY TO BE A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUROR
32.

I-lave any of you been involved with any group whose goals are to make changes
in the criminal justice system? If so, what group? What was your involvement?

33.

Would any of you prefer, for any reason, not to sit on this case? lfso, why do you

not want to sit on this jury?

5

184

34.

Are there any of you who are not in such a fair and impartial state of mind that
you would not be satisfied to have a juror possessing your mental state judge the
evidence if you or your loved ones were on trial here? In other words, would you
want someone with your state of mind sitting as a juror on a case if you were the
defendant?

35.

Do any of you have any physical problems which would interfere with your ability
to be a juror in this case?

36.

Do any of you have any negative feelings or opinions about defense attorneys?
About prosecutors?
Would those feelings or opinions interfere with your ability to be a fair and
impartial juror in this case?

DEFENDANT'S PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND RIGHT TO TESTIFY
37.

Does the mere fact that Mr. Sanchez is charged with this offense in the
Infonnation cause any of you to believe that he is probabJy guilty as charged?

38.

Do you now presume Mr. Sanchez to be innocent of the crime as charged?

39.

Do any of you feel Mr. Sanchez is more likely than not guilty because he has been

C.

~

charged with a crime?

40.

Do any of you feel that Mr. Sanchez has, or should have a burden to prove his
innocence?
6

.t 6 5
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41.

Do you understand that Mr. Sanchez has no obligation to testify?

42.

Do you nevertheless feel he should come forward and testify?

43.

Do you promise to place no burden on Mr. Sanchez to prove his innocence, but

vi)

rather require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before you could
convict Mr. Sanchez of a criminal offense?
44.

If Mr. Sanchez were to testify, would you give his testimony the same weight and
credit that you would give to any other witness?

ABILITY TO INTERACT WITH OTHER JURORS
45.

If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the conclusion that the prosecution had
not proven the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found that
a majority of the jurors believed the defendant was guilty, would you change your
verdict only because you were in the minority?

46.

Are there any of you who would not give the benefit of your own individual
judgment in arriving at a verdict in this case?

l.i;J

4 7.

Do any of you jury panelists know each other? If so, explain how you know each
other.
Would that acquaintance interfere with your ability to be a fair and impartial juror
if you and the person you know are selected to sit on the jury in this case?

7
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QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO THIS CASE
48.

G

Have any of you, your close friends, or family members at any time been the
victim of domestic violence? (The defendant suggests that members of the jury
panel who answer affirmatively be allowed to answer the following questions

~
'

privately in chambers.) lfso:
What were the circumstances of the incident?
Q

Was anyone charged with a crime regarding that incident?

If so, what was the result?
Would that experience make it hard for you to be fair and impartial in this case?
49.

"

Have any of you ever received any education or training in the area of domestic
violence and/or perfonned any volunteer or salaried work with victims of
domestic violence?

If so, please describe that education/training/experience.
Would that experience affect your ability to serve on this jury in a fair and
impartial manner?
50.

Have any of you, your family members, or close friends been accused, arrested or
charged with a crime involving an accusation of domestic violence? (The
defendant suggests that members of the jury panel who answer affirmatively be
allowed to answer the following questions privately in chambers).
lf so, what was the nature of the allegation?
8
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~

What happened in court, if the matter was prosecuted?
Would that experience make it hard for you to be fair and impartial in this case?
51.

Would the fact that the defendant is alleged to have committed domestic violence
resulting in the death of the victim make it hard for you to be a fair and impartial
juror in this case?

DATED this

j£_ day of September, 2013.

~
Trenton Ricks
Attorneys for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake District Attorney's
Office, 111 East Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, UT, 84111, this

/ti'- day of September, 2013.
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1

didn't he tell you that,

I think I might have killed her?

2

That's a question that simply required a yes or no answer.

3

At that point Mr. Warner then, you know, volunteered the

4

statement that added the - at this - you know, uthis time."

5

The statement, as has been noted, the jury thereafter, at the

6

conclusion of the testimony of Mr. Warner, was given the

7

opportunity to ask questions of Mr. Warner.

8

there any question that was - that picked up or responded to

9

any suggestion that arguably could've come from that

In no way was

10

volunteered statement.

11

been present in the minds of the jury, that would've been the

12

time when that question would've been expected, not at the

13

conclusion of the State's case a day later.
Additionally,

14

It seems to me that if the issue had

I must consider the totality of the

15

evidence that has been admitted,

16

extensive admissions by the defendant himself.

17

that the statement was made in passing,

18

by either counsel or the Court, the matter moved on, and when

19

compared to the totality of the evidence, it is -

20

error,

21

including most notably the
Considering

it was not dwelt upon

if it was

it was at best harmless error.
Now, the defense has sought to introduce, through

22

the testimony of Detective Reyes, evidence regarding certain

23

statements made by the defendant,

24

assuming, for the purpose of establishing a basis for

25

asserting the special mitigation defense of extreme emotional

I am understanding, or I'm

4

1-·---·- .....
1

-·-···

I distress.

----·-------·-----·-· - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - · - - -
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Specifically, the defense wishes to introduce

!

2

statements either allegedly made by the victim, either

3

admitting or suggesting that she'd been involved sexually

4

with the defendant's brother, and/or defendant's own

5

statements of his belief that the victim was having sexual

6

relations with his brother.

7

various alternative grounds for why that testimony should be

8

heard by the jury.

9

failure to allow that evidence violates the Sixth Amendment

The defense counsel has offered

Specifically, the defense contends that

10

Confrontation Clause, that the testimony is admissible under

11

the Rule of Completeness and/or Rule 106 of the Utah Rules of

12

Evidence, under some unspecified rule, which I understood to

13

be 608C, to show bias on the detective's part; as a non-

14

hearsay statement under 801C2, because it's not being offered

15

for the truth of the matter asserted, or as hearsay that

16

falls within the then existing state of mind exception under

17

Rule 803-3.

18

I have considered each of these grounds separately,

19

and I conclude that none of them form a basis for allowing

20

introduction of that testimony.

21

consideration, I have read all of the cases that were cited

22

by the defense and provided to me, as well as my own

23

research.

24

25

In making that

With respect to the Sixth Amendment argument, the
Confrontation Clause speaks to the defendant's right to be
5

1

confronted with witnesses against him.

2

seeking to elicit his own exculpatory statements through the

3

detective, on its face it is clear that his statements are

4

not the statements of a witness against him.

5

that he's seeking to elicit statements he attributes to the

6

decedent, they would at best be double hearsay, none of which

7

falls under an exception was cited.

8

unable to benefit from the victim's unavailability, that by

9

his own admission he created, and the alleged statements

10

would not fall within any of the exceptions to Rule 804.

11

To the extent he is

To the extent

At worst, he would be

As to his arguments about - based on the - it was

12

originally cited as the Rule of Completeness.

But I will

13

discuss it under both Rrule of Completeness and 106, because

14

the defense subsequently submitted a document making a case

15

under 106.

16

Our Supreme Court has held that, where the oral - and it's a

17

strictly oral statement, it's not been reduced to writing,

18

the Rule of Completeness may apply under Rule 611.

19

not argued to the Court.

20

put forward with respect to Rule 611.

21

Rule of Completeness does not apply in a case like this one

22

where, what we have at issue,

23

contemporaneously recorded interview, which was then

24

transcribed, and in State versus Leleae, I'm not pronouncing

25

that correctly, but it's L-E-L-E-A-E, 993 P 3 rd 232.

The Rule of Completeness is a common law rule.

That was

And certainly no analysis has been
But, in any event, the

is the defendant's

In that
6

1

case, the - a detective conducted an interview with the

2

defendant.

3

then transcribed.

4

against interest were introduced through the detective.

5

court found that, although the defendant's oral statement was

6

introduced through the detective, the statements were

7

recorded and transcribed, and Rule 106 applied - actually,

8

were sought to be introduced.

9

denial of the defense's motion to introduce the entire

The defendant's statements were tape recorded and
At trial, the defendant's statements
The

The appellate court upheld the

10

statement of the defendant for the purpose of, quote,

11

uputting the prosecution's requested portion in context."

12

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not abused

13

its discretion, and decided that this statement should be

14

included - excluded.

15

In this case, as in that - and that one, the

16

defendant's oral statement during his interview with

17

Detective Reyes was recorded and transcribed.

18

fall within 106, and not under the Rule of Completeness

19

referenced by the defense in its argument initially.

20

106, the Court must apply a fairness standard in evaluating

21

the need for admitting the remainder of a written or recorded

22

statement.

23

only those things that are relevant and necessary to qualify,

24

explain, or place into context the portion that has already

25

been introduced.

As such, they

G

Under

And under that standard, the court needs to admit

Here, the defendant seeks to admit
7

~---------- --··-· ... -·,

--------·------
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statements that are essentially a self-serving, after-the-

2

fact explanation for his conduct in assaulting the victim,

3

and that portion of that overall interview was temporally

4

removed from the inculpatory statements that had been

5

received without objection on the basis of 801-B-2.
I conclude that the fairness analysis does not

7

require the admission of the statements offered to explain

8

the reasons for his brutal assault on the victim.
Now, initially the defense cited State versus Cruz

9
10

Meza in support of his claim that the statement should be

11

received.

12

of his murder to a third person, which was an oral statement.

13

There the trial court analyzed it essentially under the

14

common law rule and excluded it on the basis that the

15

statements were not made spontaneously, and lacked the

16

indicia of trustworthiness or reliability.

17

upheld the trial court's exercise of its discretion.

18

--

''

1

6

~

...

I disagree.

In any event,

In Cruz Meza, the defendant confessed

The Supreme Court

I believe Cruz Meza is

19

distinguishable, because the statement at issue was a

20

strictly oral statement, and the admissibility analysis was

21

made under the common law Rule of Completeness, not under

22

103, which the defense has now made clear it is - that is the

23

sole basis that it is proceeding under.

24

MR. DELLAPIANA: You mean 106?

25

THE COURT: I'm sorry, 106.

Or -

I apologize.

~---_:J

1

MR. DELLAPIANA: Oh.

2,

THE COURT: I mis-spoke.

3

Now,

I will note that that last analysis or

4

statement submitted by the defense was done as, quote, a

5

reply to the State's motion in limine.

6

I had stricken the State's motion, and had not considered the

7

motion in limine because it had been untimely filed.

8

there really was nothing to reply to.

9

counsel to submit any additional briefing, which the State

I remind counsel that

But, I had invited

10

has now provided, and which the defense provided to me

11

yesterday evening.

12

So

r·.

""'

I also find no merit in the argument that the

13

defendant's statement must be received presumably under Rule

14

608C to show the detective's alleged bias.

15

certainly not pointed to any specific facts that would

16

support or show that Detective Reyes's testimony was simply

17

factually reported on the defendant's inculpatory statements,

18

is in any way tainted by bias.

19

nothing more than a straightforward response to questions put

20

to him by both the prosecution and the defense.

21

The defense has

The detective's testimony was

I similarly reject their claim that the statement

22

is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted,

23

and therefore it's not hearsay.

24

explanatory statement is, in fact,

25

truth of the matter asserted, then the defense has failed to

If the defendant's
not being offered for the

9

